

Campaign Shiloh Notes

By

Richard Walker

Campaign Shiloh began as an experiment to build a scenario based on General Ulysses S. Grant's first battle as a commanding general, the Battle of Belmont. After completing Belmont, I quickly followed it with two more little known battles that I have a personal interest in, the battles for Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, with the latter being a defining moment in the course of the war. Having already completed these scenarios, I decided to put my initial work to good use and create *Campaign Shiloh*.

In terms of wargaming history, the Battle of Shiloh has always been popular. It raises the question of *Could the South have turned the tide of war in the west with a decisive victory over Grant's army camped around Pittsburg Landing in April 1862?* With numerous variants and accurate historical scenarios, Campaign Shiloh will again challenge the gamer to change the course of history.

One of my ambitions with this new game, in contrast to *Campaign Franklin*, was my effort to introduce unique methods to play this game engine. As a result, *Campaign Shiloh* introduces to the gamer new ways to fight old battles. John Tiller's programming genius has allowed me to design games that not only fight epic land battles in the conventional manner, but also introduce amphibious landings, gunboat battles, street battles, and siege warfare. You can even fight two battles at the same time!

The scope of this game is also very ambitious. Beginning with the Battle of Belmont, *Campaign Shiloh* includes scenarios for New Madrid (Island Number 10), Cairo, Jackson, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Mill Springs, Shiloh, Frankfort, Nashville, Columbia, Franklin, Spring Hill and even a generic battlefield called Calf Killer Creek. Many of these maps are very large and allow for plenty of maneuver. I hope you enjoy it!



Project Research

Campaign Shiloh has been heavily researched to ensure that the extraordinarily high standards introduced in other John Tiller games are continued. By far (no comma) the greatest resource available to any Civil War buff, whether he be an historian, museum curator, or game designer, is *The War of Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*.^{*} This set of research books is more commonly referred to as simply (no comma) the OR. Fortunately for myself, the OR has been reproduced onto a CD. By typing in a few key words, much information can be obtained in a relatively short period of time. Most of the information concerning the Battle of Shiloh was found in volume number seven of the *Official Records*.

But as any good historian knows, relying on a single source for information is a grave mistake. So I utilized a great many other sources, both primary and secondary. Probably the most valuable primary source are the battlefields themselves. A visit to the battlefields can give great insight. Walking upon the same field that was fiercely contested over 140 years ago is certainly an enlightening experience. For example, Fort Donelson is a very well preserved battlefield that gave me much to think about as I stood near the water battery emplacements. It's stunning to imagine the Cumberland River as an avenue of attack for Flag Officer Andrew Foote's gunboat fleet. The earthworks are also very impressive. One can only imagine what would have happened had Grant been forced to attack Fort Donelson instead of accepting its surrender. Though the Confederates were fearful of being starved into submission, I personally doubt Grant would have besieged the fort, but rather would have attacked the well defended and constructed fortifications. As for Fort Henry, only twelve miles to the west, it currently lies beneath the waters of Lake Kentucky. This is a tragic shame! And needless to mention, Shiloh National Battlefield offers many interesting observations. The "bloody" pond looks peaceful today, but on April 6th 1862, it served as a graveyard for the dead and dying soldiers. I encourage you to visit these historic parks.

Much has been written about the various battles covered in *Campaign Shiloh*. Here are just a few of the many sources used to

research this project.

The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War, Major G.B. Davis*

A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion by Frederick H. Dyer

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol IV. Printed by Castle*

Company Actyh, by Sam Watkins*

Civil War Tennessee, by Thomas Connelly

That Devil Forrest, John Allan Wyeth

The Road to Shiloh, The Civil War Time Life Series Books

Where the South Lost the War, by Kendall D. Gott

Shiloh 1862, by James Arnold

Shiloh, by Larry Daniels

Shiloh: Bloody April, by Wiley Sword

The Fort Donelson Water Batteries, by Edwin Bearss

Mill Springs, by Kenneth Hafendorfer

U.S.G.S. Topographic Quadrangle Sheets

And many more...

*-primary sources

Several individuals also provided me with needed information that greatly contributed to the research. They are Dave Powell, Rob Bottos, Brett Schulte, and Susan Hawkins. Their help is greatly appreciated. Others also contributed with this project and I will mention them a bit later.



The Order of Battle(s)

One of the most important aspects of any endeavor of this kind is creating an historical Order of Battle, or OOB. If you are the grognard type and print off these OOBs, you may be a bit confused. Every effort has been taken to ensure that each OOB is as historically correct as possible. However, I will explain where you might see some differences. First, in order to create the many variants that exist with *Campaign Shiloh*, the historical OOBs were altered in order to include units that did not historically take part in the battle. For example, I created several variants of the Battle of Shiloh that include Confederate troops that historically surrendered to Grant at Fort Donelson. Also, I introduced Van Dorn's troops that were called upon but did not arrive in time to participate in the battle.

In terms of research, great effort has been made to ensure an OOB that is historically accurate. But caution must be used, along with even a little guess work. It is very important not to trust any single source when compiling an OOB. Rarely will two completely agree with each other. Often times, several sources must be combined to achieve a desired result.

The most tricky part of creating an OOB is distributing troop strengths. The *Official Records* give actual abstracts, sometimes on a weekly basis, that inform on these strengths. The tricky part can be multi-folded. It often happens that a regimental commander's O.R. report will differ from the brigade commander's report in terms of troops present. In such cases I almost always will choose the regimental commanders report as the most accurate. Unfortunately, it too often occurs that **NO** report is given. In these cases, it may happen that you take the nearest available report and divide as needed. For example: let's say that a brigade commander does mention the number of troops participating in a given battle, but only two of the five regimental commanders have submitted their reports for publication. In this case, I would take the brigade commanders total number and subtract out the given regimental reports. So if three regiments' strengths were left unreported, I would simply distribute the remaining troops to the other regiments as an average with a five percent variance.

In *Campaign Shiloh* I have included several "alternate" OOBs. For example, in Gott's book, *Where the South Lost the War*, he introduces a nicely organized OOB. I have created an OOB that exactly replicates his version for the Fort Donelson campaign. Designers that wish to use the Gott OOB will be able to design their own games using whichever OOB they prefer. The reason why the game OOB differs is completely based on my personal research using the *Official Records* and other primary sources.

Two other "alternate" OOBs are included. One for Belmont and one for Shiloh. Belmont's alternate OOB divides all the units into halves. Each unit name is followed by an "A" or "B." This OOB allows designers to create the Battle of Belmont with more units to maneuver. And finally, I created an "alternate" Shiloh OOB. This OOB includes the subordinate leaders that replaced those killed, wounded, or captured, and it sectionalizes all the artillery. Designers can place the artillery as whole batteries or in 2 gun sections. However, this is only true of batteries that employed the same type of cannon. Batteries that employed different types of cannon have not be altered.



Playtesting

I have had the great privilege to work with and have on my playtesting team many talented individuals that love these games and want them to be the very best they can be. As a result of their efforts, nearly every scenario has been thoroughly tested and tweaked to ensure a reasonable balance. It is always the case that both sides **MUST** have the possibility for victory. If one side has zero chance to win, then the game is flawed. However, some scenarios will certainly require a very skilled player for victory. But I am certain that enough variants exists for any given situation. And don't forget the game editor and optional rules

provided by John's programming skills. If you find that a game needs a few more tweaks to meet your needs, the tools are there for you, go for it!

In short, I am extremely proud of my team and it has been an honor to work with them. They are as follows:

Rob Bottos

Brett Schulte

Rich Hamilton

Tony Malone

Lee Hook

Tom Hicks

Doug Strickler



Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Nearly all war games give the player an option to play against the AI. And nearly all fall far short of being considered real competition. Unlike chess, which has a limited and well defined playing field with limited and well defined units, in complex war games such as this one it is difficult to achieve an artificial intelligence that will be both challenging and unpredictable. John

Tiller has programmed into this game a system that allows the AI to be either scripted or use a self-move dynamic A/I. A scripted AI refers to a system that allows a human designer to map out each units movements up to the point that enemy contact is made. You can script a unit to go from point A to point B at a certain time and on a certain date. If enemy contact is made, the AI will still try to make point B, but will engage the enemy until a pathway is clear for continued movement.

The designer can tell units to be in attack mode or defense mode. These different modes will affect how the units approach their destinations. You can read about how scripting is accomplished by reading the scenario editor help notes. Another form of AI is the dynamic method. Using this system, the designer does not need to script any units. Rather a simple number system tells the AI what kind of strategy it will need to adopt. Will it be offensive or defensive, extreme or normal? Of the two mentioned AI systems, the scripted system will in most cases provide the most challenging scenario to the human opponent. The trick is anticipating future enemy movements. In most cases, this is more difficult than it sounds. However, it must be stated that some scenarios will have one side or the other that is easier to script and therefore should be more challenging if played against that side. Put simply, it is easier to script a strong attack then trying to anticipate an attack and make the proper scripting for a strong defense. Some scenarios will state this fact in their descriptions. AI has come along way, but in the end, the best game will be played against a competent human opponent.



Strategy Tips

Campaign Shiloh is unique in a number of ways. As I previously mentioned, this new game introduces the ability to make amphibious landings. In other words, troops are ferried across unfordable rivers and landed near enemy targets. Also, gunboats have been upgraded in a more realistic manner. This means that their artillery, lost in battle, now counts for victory points. No longer can they venture near enemy targets with impunity. Even Confederate naval units and Union mortar boats

have been introduced for the first time. River battles along the western theater's mighty rivers have been created. And finally, siege warfare is plentiful. Don't try the frontal assaults! They can ruin your whole day.

As with all HPS Civil War titles, one important fact that must always be remembered is the notion that this is a campaign, and not a series of stand alone battles (however, each battle may be fought as a stand alone battle without attempting the campaign). After each battle, your losses will carry over to the next phase of the campaign. So, a well fought campaign can find General Grant in a much weaker state than was the historical reality. Imagine a brilliant Confederate victory early in the campaign with much higher Union losses and lower Confederate losses. In such a situation victory at Shiloh may yet become a southern dream come true.

So as a Confederate commander, conserve your strength and especially your cavalry. Your cavalry can make or break you. Don't send them head long into a copy cat of Marshal Ney's unsupported cavalry charge. Use them as hit and run flankers. Never, if possible, dismount them. They're cavalry after all! If you can time your attack carefully and get in the enemies rear or flank, a melee will almost always result in massive casualties for your foes. But be mindful of the fact that there may be enemy cavalry lurking not far away. What you can do to them can be done to you. Before making an attack, calculate the possibility of the enemy making an effective counter-attack. If your cavalry fails to last the entire length of the campaign, your campaign will fail.

Artillery can also be an important weapon, if used correctly. But be careful. You only have a limited number of cannon, and once gone, they're gone forever. Unlike *Campaign Franklin*, the Shiloh battlefield is covered with dense woods. Artillery rarely can make long range shots. So be mindful of your artillery placements and victory points lost if destroyed or captured. But for those that enjoy artillery duels, *Campaign Shiloh* offers numerous battlefield situations that give ample opportunity for lots of artillery fire. Not to mention the gunboats.



Things to Remember

Campaign Shiloh has many unique features if your use to standard game play. So here are some things to remember:

1) Ability to cross or move along a large river is denoted by the letter "B." The "B" stands for *boat*. This letter can be found next to the movement points allowed by a unit in the unit info box. Movement along a river system is 3 MPs per hex. They cannot be sunk!

This system of water movement is intended to represent the many different types of steamers that were engaged in troop transport. For example; Buell's crossing of the Tennessee River at Shiloh, Pillow's crossing of the Mississippi River at Belmont, etc... The boats are **NOT** meant to represent small boats carried by the individual unit. That concept is left for 20th century warfare.

2) Ship artillery count for victory points if destroyed. The value is the same as for field artillery. When a ship's artillery is all destroyed, it is considered sunk.

3) Gunboats can only stack 2 per hex. This reduces the combined firepower that a single shot could produce.

4) Poor weather has been introduced. When you see the "Poor Weather" note displayed on the status line, visibility is limited to 4 hexes and movement is slightly reduced.

5) Units that suffer strength damage in a campaign game recover 10% of its lost strength if present in the next battle. Units that were eliminated are returned at 10% of original strength.

6) Units that start the game as "emplaced" cannot move or change formation. Simply put, they fire, and if necessary, die.

7) Units cannot build breastworks in the historical Battle of Shiloh scenario. It was found during playtesting that the Union player was using the Confederate approach time to build breastworks. Since the rebel attack should be considered a surprise attack, this feature was added for selected scenarios. Other scenarios are not affected by this feature.



Historical Notes

Introduction

By

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By the latter part of 1861, the divided nation was beginning to understand that this new war would be a long and bloody fight. In the east, the Union advance into Virginia was soundly defeated at Bull Run (a.k.a. Manassas). Washington was eager for some good news that would encourage the people to stay the course and reunite the nation, no matter what the cost. Soon, a little known general would give the North the encouragement it so badly needed. Ulysses S. Grant would be that general. First, he would lead 3,000 men to execute a small raid intended to disrupt the Confederates and cause confusion.

This first battle, near Belmont Missouri, would show the world that the North had a general willing to fight and make whatever sacrifice was necessary to achieve victory. Belmont would soon be followed by the stunning victories over two important Confederate fortifications. The first to fall would be Fort Henry, guarding the Tennessee River. The second and most important was the capture of Fort Donelson, along with its garrison of 12-15,000 remaining defenders. Not only did the South lose nearly a third of its entire army stationed in the western theater, but it also lost control of the Cumberland River and its first Confederate state capital, Nashville. These were losses the South could ill-afford.

In desperation, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston developed a plan to surprise and destroy Grant's army camped around Pittsburg Landing on the western shore of the Tennessee River. A victory could reverse the defeats already inflicted upon the southern cause in the west. **Campaign Shiloh** hopes to recreate these great battles and provide even more possibilities.

Please read the following short histories of the historical battles included in this game package.



Battle of Belmont

"A Star Begins To Shine" November 7, 1861

After four hours of hard stand-up fighting, the 2,300 Confederate soldiers under the command of Gen. Gideon Pillow had given way and, panic-stricken, found a protected refuge under the bank of the Mississippi River. Early that morning they had marched out to meet an attacking force of 3,100 Union troops under Gen. Ulysses S. Grant that had been transported by boat from their camp at Cairo, Ill. The Rebels fought stubbornly but had been pushed back to their camp at the shabby hamlet of Belmont, MO., where they finally broke and ran. Grant's troops were celebrating and looting the Confederate camp when they suddenly came under fire from Confederate cannon on the high bluff across the river at Columbus, KY. There was the main Confederate encampment, commanded by Gen. Leonidas Polk. Polk ferried another 2,700 Confederate troops across the river, placed them both up- and downstream of the Union force, and attacked.

An agitated aide rode up to Grant, exclaiming that they were surrounded. Unperturbed, Grant calmly replied, "Well, we must cut

our way out as we cut our way in." And that is exactly what they did. Although hard-pressed, the Union soldiers fought their way back upriver to their transport ships, with Grant the last to get on board; then they steamed back north. Grant, who had been forced to leave behind his wounded and the captured Confederate materials, had been fortunate to escape with his command intact, but still claimed a victory. The Confederates also declared victory in the battle, which had claimed about 600 casualties on each side.

The whole affair was in fact a worthless waste of men and supplies; Belmont was of no strategic importance. The battle did, however, showcase the talents of the previously unknown Union general, Ulysses S. Grant. The attack was well planned and initially successful, and the retreat was conducted well under his supervision. He showed his superiors that he would fight, a quality sadly lacking in Union generals during the first years of the war.

<http://civilwar.bluegrass.net/battles-campaigns/1861/611107b.html>



The Battle of Mill Springs

Although Brig. Gen. Felix K. Zollicoffer's main responsibility was to guard Cumberland Gap, in November 1861 he advanced west into Kentucky to strengthen control in the area around Somerset. He found a strong defensive position at Mill Springs and decided to make it his winter quarters. He fortified the area, especially both sides of the Cumberland River. Union Brig. Gen. George Thomas received orders to drive the Rebels across the Cumberland River and break up Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden's army. He left Lebanon and slowly marched through rain-soaked country, arriving at Logan's Crossroads on January 17, where he waited for Brig. Gen. A. Schoepf's troops from Somerset to join him. Maj. Gen. George Crittenden, Zollicoffer's superior, had arrived at Mill Springs and taken command of the Confederate troops. He knew that Thomas was in the vicinity and decided that his best defense was to attack the Yankees. The Rebels attacked Thomas at Logan's Crossroads at dawn on

January 19. Unbeknownst to the Confederates, some of Schoepf's troops had arrived and reinforced the Union force. Initially, the Rebel attack forced the first unit it hit to retire, but stiff resistance followed and Zollicoffer was killed. The Rebels made another attack but were repulsed. Union counterattacks on the Confederate right and left were successful, forcing them from the field in a retreat that ended in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Mill Springs, along with Middle Creek, broke whatever Confederate strength there was in eastern Kentucky. Confederate fortunes did not rise again until summer when Gen. Braxton Bragg launched his offensive into Kentucky. Mill Springs was the larger of the two Union Kentucky victories in January 1862. With these victories, the Federals carried the war into Middle Tennessee in February.

Forts Henry & Donelson

The fall of Forts Henry & Donelson in February 1862 launched U.S. Grant's Mississippi campaign culminating in the capture of Vicksburg. The forts were located near Dover, TN in what is now called "The Land Between the Lakes" -- which was actually the land between the rivers -- about an hour's drive northwest of Nashville.

The 536-acre national battlefield includes the visitor center, the Dover Hotel (Surrender House), and Fort Donelson with associated earthen rifle pits and river cannon batteries. Approximately 20% of the core battlefield is within the park. There is also Fort Donelson National Cemetery (established in 1867).

The town of Dover itself is actually a part of the battlefield, e.g., the fortified lines extended into town, and the surrender was signed at the hotel.

In looking at the pre-battle chatter, it seems that no one really understood the importance of Forts Henry & Donelson. The beloved Albert Sidney Johnston had a 500-mile front to defend -- from Island No. 10 north of Memphis to the Cumberland Gap. For him, everything was strategic since any loss would open up an invasion route.

On the Union side, the Henry & Donelson issue was more happenstance than anything else. Lew Wallace writes post-war that the origins of the idea are obscure, but we are sure that Grant pushed the plan on his boss Halleck. However, Grant was more interested in alleviating his boredom than any brilliant strategic move. Halleck was the true bureaucrat: avoid blame no matter what. He put off Grant until it looked like he would be upstaged by Buell after Mill Springs.

What they all missed were the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Losing the Cumberland Gap left a Union army to forage in Eastern Tennessee. After Island No. 10 were Memphis and Vicksburg -- major defensive points. When Henry & Donelson fell the next stop was Muscle Shoals, Alabama.

To illustrate, note that after Grant passed Henry & Donelson his next fight was at Pittsburg Landing just north of Corinth, MS. Nashville and Clarksville, with its important ironworks, were exposed to Foote's gunboats and quickly surrendered. Memphis and Vicksburg now had to look to an attack from the east as well as upriver. It was an accidentally brilliant strategic move, devastating to the Confederacy.

Fort Henry fell quickly to the gunboats, so the main battle interest is at Fort Donelson. The winter march was something of a novelty in 1862. It shows how the military thinking was stuck in the Napoleonic Era when the wet weather would foul the gunpowder used to prime the pan.

Fort Henry was clearly untenable, in a low area on the east side of the Tennessee. A. S. Johnston had repeatedly ordered that the high ground on the west side of the River be fortified. There was a Fort Heiman already in place on the west side, but it was in "neutral" Kentucky. No other action was taken. By February 1862, Fort Henry was partially inundated and the river threatened to flood the rest. It was a typical earthen fort with outdated guns and a smallish garrison.

On February 4-5, Grant landed his divisions after reconnoitering at two locations, one on the east bank of the Tennessee River to prevent the garrison's escape and the other to occupy the high ground on the west side which would insure the fort's fall. The only tactical obstacle on the east side was a small stream, but to land the forces any closer would have put them in gun range from the fort. Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote's seven gunboats closed within 400 yards and began bombarding the fort.

Lloyd Tilghman, commander of the fort's garrison, realized that it was only a matter of time before Fort Henry fell. While leaving artillery in the fort to hold off the Union fleet, he escorted the rest of his force out of the area and sent them safely off on the route to Fort Donelson, 10 miles east. Tilghman then returned to the fort and surrendered to the fleet. Fort Henry's also let Grant send the gunboats upriver to destroy some critical railroad bridges.

From February 6 to 16, the missing man in the equation was Albert Sidney Johnston, Confederate commander in the west. On February 7, the day after Fort Henry fell, he held a staff meeting at his headquarters in Bowling Green where he decided to split his forces, sending 12,000 reinforcements to Fort Donelson and falling back from Bowling Green to Nashville with the remainder.

The strategic issue here was to prevent Grant and Buell's army in Kentucky from uniting. Grant was the weaker of the two

forces, and his supply line from Fort Henry traveled back 150 miles to Halleck's command in St. Louis. An immediate attack against Grant would also have the advantage of the Fort Donelson garrison. From February 6th to the 16th, Grant was stuck in the mud.

Johnston was able to quickly assemble troops for an attack at Shiloh, but for some reason he was unwilling to react to the loss of Henry. Even then, it seems that no one really understood just how far the rivers reached.

After capturing Fort Henry on February 6, Grant advanced cross-country to invest Fort Donelson. He was opposed by Confederate commander John Floyd, who made no attempt to oppose Grant's advance. By February 14 Grant had a loose half-circle around the fort.

On February 14 Foote's gunboats tried another bombardment. However, the guns at Donelson were newer and better sited, and Foote took serious losses and retreated downriver. The Union ground forces tested the earthworks, which had been thrown up mostly after the fall of Henry.

Floyd determined to break out, and his attack on February 15 actually opened up a corridor. Grant launched an inconclusive counterattack which so unnerved Floyd that he ordered the troops back into the fort and started making plans to surrender. Nathan Bedford Forrest said that he didn't join the Confederacy to surrender his command and took his cavalry out across the Cumberland River.

Johnston had designated the forts as "strategic." Even in Confederate parlance, this meant something more vigorous than a quick surrender. The fall of the two forts and the loss of 13,000 Southern troops was a major victory for Grant and a catastrophe for the South. Shortly afterwards Johnston abandoned Nashville, which was ostensibly the reason why he hadn't attacked Grant in the first place.

The loss ensured that Kentucky would stay in the Union and opened up Tennessee for an advance along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Along with the fall of New Orleans it also demonstrated that the idea of an "independent nation" was a sham. The Union army could now go wherever it wanted.

Surrender of Fort Donelson

Confederate scouts searched for avenues of escape that night. Army doctors counseled that the men could not survive crossing frozen creeks and the long trek to Nashville. Buckner became gripped by battle fatigue and fears of Smith's division. Pillow urged continued resistance, Floyd vacillated. Time was wasted and in a midnight council that has since been defined understanding, a decision was made to surrender to Grant on the morrow. Forrest stalked angrily into the night, vowing to escape. Floyd and Pillow, fearing punishment at the hands of Union authorities, similarly deserted, passing command to Buckner. Floyd's three thousand man Virginia brigade, Pillows personal staff and uncounted hundreds of others evaded the Union dragnet over the days after the surrender. But when Buckner sent a flag of truce to his opponent that night, the Confederate fighting men became enraged and nearly mutinied at this betrayal by their leaders.

Eventually, Buckner met with his old army friend, Grant in the hamlet of Dover, within Confederate lines. Grant demanded unconditional surrender and Buckner, though aghast at such treatment from an old colleague was powerless to refuse. Grant telegraphed Halleck later that day. "We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners including Generals Buckner and Bushrod Johnson, also about 20,000 stands of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses and large quantities of commissary stores."



FORT DONELSON, *February 16, 1862.*

By

General Ulysses. S. Grant

GENERAL: I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surrender this morning of Fort Donelson, with 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant with a force of about 15,000 men, divided into two divisions, under the command of Generals McClelland and Smith. Six regiments were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat, or rather started one day later than one of the gunboats, and with instructions not to pass it. The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column arriving within 2 miles of the fort at 12 o'clock m. At this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and re-enforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day.

The evening of the 13th the gunboats and re-enforcements arrived. On the 14th a gallant attack was made by Flag-Officer Foote upon the enemy's works with the fleet. The engagement lasted probably an hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably to the cause of the Union, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored boats so that they were carried back by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled, also having received a number of heavy shots about the pilot-houses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps I concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify and await repairs to the gunboats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous

attack upon our right wing, commanded by General J. A. McClelland, with a portion of the force under General L. Wallace. The enemy were repelled after a closely contested battle of several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers, and particularly field officers, suffered out of proportion. I have not the means yet of determining our loss even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of 1,200 killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter I understand through General Buckner about 250 were taken prisoners. I shall retain enough of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately shipped off and not left for recapture.

About the close of this action the ammunition in cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks, and, seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion and possibly greater demoralization existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, giving us possession of part of the intrenchments. An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced by the divisions under Generals McClelland and Wallace, which, notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the forepart of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their labors at an early hour in the morning. This morning at a very early hour a note was received from General S. B. Buckner, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice, &c. A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith accompanying.

I cannot mention individuals who specially distinguished themselves, but leave that to division and brigade commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received. To division commanders, however, Generals McClelland, Smith, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that each of them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves. At the hour the attack was made on General McClelland's command I was absent, having received a note from Flag-Officer Foote requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call, in consequence of a wound received the day before.

BATTLE OF NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10 OVERVIEW

Confederate forces under Brig. Gen. Pillow started construction of these two positions in April 1861, to block Federal navigation of the Mississippi. When Polk withdrew from Columbus, Ky., during the period 29 Feb. - 2 Mar. '62 in the preliminary moves of the Shiloh campaign, he sent the 5,000-man division of McCown to reinforce the 2,000 then occupying these two river positions. On a peninsula 10 miles long by three miles wide the defenses consisted of a two-regiment redoubt at New Madrid, and land batteries on a floating battery at Island No. 10. The latter was covered by land batteries on the Tenn. Shore. Federal forces had to reduce these forts in connection with their general offensive down the Mississippi. (Henry- Donelson and Shiloh campaigns.)

Halleck had sent some of Pope's force in central Mo. To reinforce Grant's attack on Donelson; he also told Pope to organize a corps from the remaining troops in Mo. and to capture New Madrid.

Pope realized that the 50 heavy guns and the small fleet of gunboats the Confederates had in and near the position necessitated a regular siege operation. He sent for siege artillery and started a bombardment and the construction of approaches on 13 Mar. On this same date McCown ordered the evacuation of New Madrid and moved the garrison across the river to the peninsula in order to avoid being isolated. For this action he was relieved of command and succeeded by Mackall. Pope now decided to cross the river south of New Madrid and turn the defense of Island No. 10. Since his supporting naval transports were upstream, he had a canal cut through the swamps so that boats could by-pass the defenses of Island No. 10. The canal was finished 4 Apr. Two Federal gunboats ran the Confederate batteries to support the river crossing, and on 7 Apr four regiments were ferried across the Mississippi to cut the Confederate line of retreat at Tiptonville. Mackall surrendered 3,500 men (over 1,500 of whom were sick) and 500 escaped through the swamps. Pope's victory opened the Mississippi to Fort Pillow, and gave him a reputation which led to his being selected by Lincoln two months later to command the Army of Virginia (2nd Bull Run Campaign).

Source: "The Civil War Dictionary" by Mark M. Boatner III



The Battle of Shiloh

On the morning of April 6, 1862, the sun rose over the Union encampment at Pittsburg Landing. Neither Ulysses S. Grant, the Union commander, nor Albert S. Johnston, the Confederate commander, could possibly know what this day would hold. It would bring advances in military tactics. It would bring innovations in the medical field. It would change all preconceived notions that the Civil War would be short-lived. For Johnston and thousands of other brave soldiers on the Union and Confederate sides, it would bring death.

During the winter of 1861-62 Federal forces pushing southward from St. Louis captured Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. This action forced Gen. Johnston to abandon southern Kentucky and much of West and Middle Tennessee. After withdrawing further south, he established a new line covering the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the only all-weather link between Richmond and Memphis. Realizing that he could not wait for another Federal advance, Johnston began concentrating forces at Corinth, Mississippi, where he hoped to take the offensive and destroy General Grant's Army of the Tennessee before it could be joined by General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio.

On April 2, 1862, Johnston began his march from Corinth. "The roads were meandering cow paths," one confederate soldier said. Because of the lack of marching experience, the march took much longer than expected.

Meanwhile, at the Union camp at Shiloh, the Federals troops spent a day drilling and merry-making. Hundreds went for a swim in Owl Creek. Others rested. There was also a good deal of diarrhea, which the boys labeled the "Tennessee quick step".

Grant wired his superior General H.W. Halleck. "I have scarcely the faintest idea of attack." Halleck told Grant to "sit tight at Shiloh and wait for Buell to arrive." William Tecumseh Sherman, division commander, was quoted saying to reporters, "Take your regiment to Ohio. No enemy is nearer than Corinth." Little did he know that the night of April 5, the huge and powerful Army of the Mississippi was poised to strike just out of sight of the Union camp. P.G.T. Beauregard, second in command of the Confederates, felt they had lost the element of surprise because of some shots fired by the men in front. Beauregard pleaded

with Johnston to postpone the attack. "I would fight them if they were a million," Johnston said.

On the morning of April 6, Johnston told his fellow officers "Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee." When Johnston's powerful Army of the Mississippi hit the federal camps, they had achieved complete surprise. The attack pushed most Union divisions back to reform elsewhere. Others fought doggedly to hold their line.

Once the attack started, there was mass confusion on both sides. Most of the boys had never been in battle before, and did not know there orders. "It was a murderous fist fight."

The Rebels rolled over one Union position after another. Then, amongst the confusion along a sunken road, the federals finally established and held a line that stopped the southern advance. The division consisted of Illinois and Iowa farm boys mostly, under the command of General Prentiss. Grant's orders were to "Hold the sunken road at all costs." Prentiss greatly understood the seriousness of Grant's orders. Bullets buzzed through the saplings around the area, and it appeared and sounded like a hornet's nest. The Confederate infantry launched eleven attacks on the Hornet's nest. The Union line wavered and bent, but would not break. The Confederate artillery lined up sixty-two cannons at point blank range and fired on the sunken road. It was the largest number of cannons ever used at that time in a war effort. Under protection of the cannons the Rebel troops were able to move in and take the sunken road. The Union troops were forced to surrender. They had fought well holding the Confederates for six hours. For years to come Union veterans were proud to say, "I fought with Prentiss at the Hornet's Nest."

There was also a great deal of fighting at a peach orchard, just yards away from the Hornet's Nest. The peach trees were in full bloom. Many soldiers lay dead. Peach blossoms covered the dead like a fresh-fallen snow. Gen. Johnston led the last raid on the peach orchard. He came out with his clothes tattered from bullets that had grazed him, and his boot sole was shot. A Confederate officer saw him wobbling in his saddle and ask if he were hurt. "Yes," he replied. "And I feel seriously." His aid took him to a nearby tree. He was shot in the back of the leg. He bled to death. He could have easily been saved with a tourniquet, but he had sent his surgeon off to care for Union prisoners.

A farm pond near the peach orchard was covered with soldiers from both armies. Many men went to bathe their wounds and drink from the water. For many it was their last drink The water was stained red with blood.

That night dead lay everywhere. Neither army had developed a system for gathering the dead General Grant said a person can walk in any given direction without stepping on ground." In a Confederate camp that night one soldier said, "You can hear the screams of the injured. They screamed for water, God heard them for the heavens opened and the rain fell." Flashes of lightning showed vultures feeding on the ungathered dead.

On the night of April 6, the long-awaited arrival of Don Carlos Buell's reinforcements arrived. Through the cover of gunboat fire, his troops came in on steamboats. The gun boats fired on fifteen minute intervals, allowing Buell's forces to come aground, and robbing the Confederates of their greatly needed rest.

That morning the Confederates were pushed back on the ground that they had fought so hard to win the day before. With the fresh troops, the weary Rebels had little chance to win a complete victory. The Southerners were forced to march back to Corinth.

The final number of dead or missing was 13,000 on the Union side and 10,500 on the Confederate side. There were as many people killed at Shiloh as there were at Waterloo. The difference between that Napoleonic war and the Civil War is that there weren't twenty more Waterloos to come.

Shiloh was a decisive battle in the war. The South needed a win to make up for land lost in Kentucky and Ohio. It also needed to save the Mississippi Valley. Memphis and Vicksburg were now vulnerable to Union attack, and after Corinth there is now doubt that those cities would be the next targets.

However, Grant and his men had been rid of their over-confidence by the battle of Shiloh. They now knew that hopes for an easy victory over the south were ill-founded. Grant knew then that this war was going to be, in the words of a Union Soldier, "A very bloody affair."

Shiloh is a Hebrew word meaning place of peace.

www.hardinhistory.com/history/shiloh.htm <<http://www.hardinhistory.com/history/shiloh.htm>>.

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