

I. Designer's Notes

1. Opposing numbers:

Until relatively recent times, it was conventional wisdom that Lee was significantly outnumbered during the Seven Days Campaign. This notion is no longer generally accepted as truth. Whichever of the multitude of counting measures has been used, modern research has demonstrated that the effective strengths of both armies were actually very close. When one includes reinforcing troops from the Valley and the Eastern seaboard, Lee actually slightly outnumbered McClellan during the Seven Days when one takes into account the deductions to overall Federal strength for required garrison duties. Notably large numbers of Union troops were stationed at White House and Fort Monroe. Of course, Lincoln's withholding of most of McDowell's powerful I Corps didn't help either.

On the other side, thousands more troops were theoretically available to Lee, though the vast majority were "static" garrison troops—including untrained and raw state militia, local defense forces, organizing artillery companies and battalions, and independent cavalry companies. When these units are included, the number of Confederate soldiers in the Richmond area had a peak strength of well over 100,000 soldiers.

2. Batteries:

At the time of the Peninsula Campaign (and for long after), the vast majority of Confederate batteries were of mixed composition—some number of rifled guns, smoothbore field artillery and howitzers were present in the same battery. In order to have as accurate an order of battle as possible, I elected to break down the batteries of both sides if their composition varied. Thus, players will find most Confederate batteries broken down into sections while most Union batteries are of uniform composition and will be shown on the map as single units. Similarly, the cavalry regiments from both sides were split into battalions to add flexibility for scouting and flank protection.

3. Cavalry:

In Campaign Peninsula cavalry are disrupted when moving into rough, orchard, or forest hexes while mounted. Mounted cavalry could not maintain any semblance of order while moving through dense forests with thick undergrowth, much less mount a charge in formation. The same principle is applied to mounted units moving through the other terrain types mentioned above. Of course, infantry formations would also have problems in such terrain but to a lesser degree. Also, having woods disrupt infantry formations does not work as well within the game system.

4. Weather Effects:

Though it has not been my practice as a scenario designer to make drastic changes due to adverse weather there is a large volume of evidence that the incessant rains preceding the Battle of Seven Pines created unusual obstacles to movement. Bridges and stretches of corduroy roadway were swept away by the raging Chickahominy River and ordinary roads were turned into deep ribbons of mud. Additionally, due to the nearby extension of White Oak Swamp, the bottomland at Oak Grove where the Battle of Seven Pines began was completely inundated with standing water. Troops described moving through waist and even chest deep water when moving through the swampy forestland west of Seven Pines. Because of this, the MP costs were adjusted upward for the Seven Pines scenarios (see Parameter Data under the Main Program's Help menu for details). These changes have significant effects upon the movements of all three arms.

5. Roads:

The quality of roads in the Richmond area varied widely, rendered worse by the bad weather in May and June of 1862. The majority of the best thoroughfares in the Peninsula beyond Richmond ran in an east-west direction so players will find it much easier to move their armies laterally. Many other roads (i.e. New Road and Meadow Road) are designated as trails in the game to illustrate their poor quality relative to roads such as the Williamsburg Road, Mechanicsville Turnpike, etc. This is the reason why there are so many "trails" on the map in places where one might expect to find "roads".

6. The Seven Days Campaign Game:

As a design choice, the Confederate player is given the initiative at the beginning of the campaign game (this serves to illustrate the audacity of Lee vs. the timidity of McClellan; however, there are many other scenarios included in the game that allow the Federal player to promote offensive action).

The Battle of Oak Grove was a minor affair and is a tune-up event so to speak as it is the first situation in the campaign game. Players, especially the Union player, need not go all out to "win" there. The second situation in the campaign is its centerpiece and the result is crucial in terms of the direction the campaign will take. Momentum is important. A successful battle north or south of the river by the Confederate player will ensure the maintenance of initiative for the next campaign situation and the Union player will be forced to react. Victory on the battlefield in key

situations will allow the Union player to wrest control of the campaign and initiate his own offensive action. Once this occurs the goal is nothing less than the capture of Richmond. The city itself doesn't necessarily need to be occupied in order to ensure its fall. If the forts and high ground surrounding Richmond are captured by Union forces, the city will have to be evacuated.

7. **Gunboats:**

Several scenarios have gunboats available for one or both sides. These ships were often outfitted with several different armament types ranging from light artillery to massive naval guns but, for our purposes, I chose the most powerful gun with the longest range as the armament to be represented in the game.

8. **"Campaign" Scenarios:**

These scenarios are the historical scenarios of various length that begin on each day of the Seven Days beginning with June 25 and end on the night of July 1. Though all game scenarios can be played versus the AI, the length of the campaign scenarios among other factors makes them particularly unsuited for human vs. AI play. Numerous instances of a side switching back and forth from offense to defense, the necessity of multiple river crossings, and the extensive maneuvering that is possible over scenarios of such length and breadth makes certain ones (most notably the 7, 6, 5, 4, and 3 Day scenarios) more suitable for Human vs. Human—PBEM, Hotseat, or Internet—play.

9. **Building Breastworks:**

Many scenarios in Campaign Peninsula will not allow breastwork construction in-game. While playing one of these scenarios, the player will see the message "Breastworks cannot be constructed in this scenario" when breastwork building is attempted. Another way to check this feature's availability for a particular scenario is to view the Parameter Data Help menu—the building % will be 0. Historically, Civil War armies on the move and during battle did not generally construct makeshift breastworks at each opportunity during the war's early years (1861-1862). Of course, there are notable exceptions to every generalization but, given that breastwork construction is unlimited within the game system, it would be more realistic to disallow battlefield breastwork construction altogether than to allow it to go unchecked at levels seen ordinarily only in the period from late-1863 through 1865. However, for those players that do not wish to be restricted, many of the historical and historical variant scenarios included in the game have versions that are different only in a player's ability to build breastworks.

10. **Fixed Units:**

Not everyone likes the scenario designer's use of fixed units with specific or variable release times. Indeed, it isn't always a perfect or elegant solution. However, the use of fixed units in certain scenarios is a must in order to attempt to better simulate the fog-of-war of the 19th century battlefield within the game system *as it exists*. For instance, in the Confederate Offensive campaign situation (the second situation), the Union player has the option to deploy varying numbers of corps (1, 2 or 3) north of the Chickahominy. The Union player, with his top down God's-eye view of the field (and perhaps in-depth knowledge of the different scenarios beforehand) will immediately "see" a major Confederate offensive movement south of the river—Confederate choice 3—and attempt to recross the river immediately with all available forces. This is just not possible. Though it may or may not be obvious to the gameplayer, the 19th century officer would not know if the attack was the main assault or a feint and is further hampered by poor maps and slow and uncertain communications both up and down the chain of command. It is more reasonable to assume that it would take many hours to determine which front is most threatened and to coordinate orders moving tens of thousands of men, horses, wagons, and guns and directing them back over poor roads and bridges in order to reach the main arena. In this instance, pre-battle strategic deployments represent a real commitment not easily changed. There must often be a more explicit 'carrot and stick' approach in scenario design in order to achieve meaningful options.

II. Strategy Tips

General Tips

1. *Conserve your cavalry:*

In general, avoid the temptation to fight heavy battles with cavalry alone. Though there are ample opportunities to inflict heavy losses on the opposing cavalry, all-cavalry fights are usually not decisive in their effects on the campaign as a whole and heavy cavalry losses will deprive the army of its "eyes". Also, in a tight battle, VPs gained or lost due to cavalry casualties may be the deciding factor in who wins the scenario. Cavalry are best used for covering exposed flanks, screening an advance, exploiting gains, or covering the army's rear by blocking roads and trails that the enemy can use to their advantage. Sustained fighting, especially against enemy infantry, cannot be recommended in ordinary circumstances. If you do fight, be sure to concentrate several regiments in reserve so that

overwhelmed units can be safely extricated.

2. *Watch your artillery ammunition supply:*

Batteries cannot be fired at all possible opportunity without exhausting the ammunition reserves. Conserve ammunition for succeeding days if a continued fight is expected. This is especially important when playing the multi-day "campaign" scenarios. Also, be advised that Confederate artillery ammunition reserves are smaller than those of the Army of the Potomac. Adjusting the opportunity fire ranges for the artillery can help in this regard.

3. *Preserve your combat leaders:*

Devastating losses in leadership in a single battle will effect the entire campaign. Often formations filled with poorly trained troops are held together only by the quality of their leaders. Although keeping all subordinate units within command range is crucial, think twice before committing leaders to the front lines regularly. This is especially important with Campaign Peninsula, where both armies have many good combat leaders leading large but inexperienced brigades. You cannot lose these leaders in large numbers and maintain brigade cohesion at the same time.

4. *Pay close attention to the information provided by the campaign screens and pre-battle messages:*

These screens provide players with valuable intelligence. For each campaign situation, carefully read **all** the choices and weigh the pros and cons of each before choosing. Even if you already know what you want to do there is often relevant information included in the descriptions of the other choices. Also, and this is **very important**, the message dialog preceding the beginning of each scenario can provide crucial clues on how to fight the battle.

5. *Use termination bids:*

Some scenarios are multi-day affairs. If *neither* side wishes to initiate more combat after even a short time period then **by all means use the termination bid**—it greatly shortens campaign completion time. Campaign Peninsula includes some very long scenarios (up to 7 days!).

6. *Always remember that each individual battle is only a part of the larger campaign:*

Though there is limited straggler return between battles it is best to consider every man and every gun irreplaceable. As opposed to the common mindset of players involved in tactical level games covering single battles, Campaign Peninsula requires that objectives be met with some concern for casualties, as losses are carried over to the next situation's battle. Never lose an opportunity to flank your opponent out of a strong position rather than carry it by direct assault.

7. **Thoughts on the use of artillery:**

- Always detach infantry units to support your batteries. You'll be glad you did when your lines of inexperienced regiments break and the guns need to be withdrawn. Most batteries are lost needlessly due to the temptation of deploying all available units at the front.
- Park artillery that is likely to be ineffective. There is no reason to have all your artillery in action in all situations. If a long range artillery duel erupts, howitzers and obsolete six pounders will be of little use and will waste valuable ammunition. If the terrain is constricted, rough, or without open space to the front, park the artillery in the rear. You are just asking for disaster if you deploy your artillery in forestlands. They have no clear field of fire and are almost impossible to extricate if your lines collapse.
- Spread your artillery out to historical frontages and avoid hub to hub deployment. The wider the front the greater the opportunity for bringing enfilade fire to bear. Rifled artillery on the flanks and howitzers/Napoleons in the center (or wherever it is most likely the enemy's infantry will attack) can be a good combination.
- Avoid placing rifled guns in the front lines. They are your most valuable pieces and are less effective at canister range compared with howitzers and other smoothbore guns.
- If unsupported and capture appears imminent, limber the guns. You can't count on a blast of canister to disrupt the enemy. You risk the loss of the gun crew due to ranged small arms fire but it is relatively difficult for a meleeing unit to capture all of a unit's limbered guns.
- As the Union player, turn fights into artillery battles whenever you can—the Confederate long arm cannot match the U.S. in weight of metal. While the Federal artillery has large numbers of rifled batteries and powerful siege guns, most Confederate batteries are mixed in composition with many obsolete six-pounders and large numbers of short range howitzers.

III. Historical Notes

The following historical notes are not meant to be exhaustive but rather comprise brief summaries of the major

actions that occurred during the period beginning with the Battle of Seven Pines and ending with the conclusion of the Seven Days campaign. Interested readers are advised to examine the Selected Sources section of these notes for suggested reference works—Brian Burton's *Extraordinary Circumstances* for the Seven Days actions and *The Battle of Seven Pines* by Steven Newton are especially recommended.

A. Battle of Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) – May 31-June 1, 1862

On the eve of the Battle of Seven Pines, the Confederate Army of the Northern Virginia found itself on the outskirts of Richmond. Its commander, General Joseph E. Johnston, could retreat no more without abandoning the capital. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army of the Potomac under General George B. McClellan shadowed the retreating Confederates and now straddled the Chickahominy River north and east of Johnston's position. Recent torrential rains washed away bridges and roads, making movement back and forth across the river difficult. With three of five infantry corps north of a raging river, the Federal army was vulnerable. The Confederates were gifted with a golden opportunity for a devastating counterattack against the two enemy corps isolated south of the river.

General Johnston's battleplan involved a massive hammer blow with the majority of his brigades. D.H. Hill's division, moving directly east on the Williamsburg Road, would open the battle with a frontal attack on the Seven Pines crossroads. James Longstreet's large division (backed up by W.H.F. Whiting's division and supported by elements of John B. Magruder's corps-level command) would comprise the army's left flank and attack from the northwest down the Nine Mile Road in the direction of Fair Oaks. Meanwhile, Benjamin Huger's small division would quickly march down the Charles City Road and turn the Union left flank.

Opposing these Confederate divisions were the Federal III and IV Corps, commanded by Generals Samuel Heintzelman and Erasmus Keyes. Silas Casey's raw IV Corps division was protected by light breastworks and an earthen redoubt located a half mile west of Seven Pines and directly in front of Hill's division. Large numbers of trees were felled to form a dense abatis in front of Casey's position. The other IV Corps division (Darius Couch's) was placed behind Casey in direct support. The two III Corps divisions were stationed far to the rear, with Joe Hooker at White Oak Swamp Bridge and Philip Kearny near Bottom's Bridge.

Alas, all did not go well for the Confederate attack. Bumbling by James Longstreet, who changed Johnston's attack orders without informing his superior, caused a massive traffic jam with Huger at Gillies Creek just outside of Richmond. This was a fatal delay that cost Johnston's army several hours of precious daylight and, even worse, ruined any possibility of a coordinated offensive across a wide front.

The Battle of Seven Pines finally began at approximately 1 p.m. with D.H. Hill's frontal assault on Casey's division. With the help of Couch (and later Kearny and Hooker's III Corps divisions), Casey's men fought well but the Union forces in the Seven Pines sector were eventually pushed back and defeated. To the north, General Whiting, his front cleared by the absence of Longstreet's men, got his division into the fight and attacked Fair Oaks station. With the help of General Sumner's II Corps (which crossed the swollen Chickahominy mid-afternoon), Whiting was checked with heavy losses. Longstreet's footsore division marched and countermarched aimlessly and did not see any significant action on the 31st. Eventually, the Union army was able to form a stronger defensive line and the Confederate breakthrough at Seven Pines was contained.

At twilight, while conducting a personal reconnaissance at the northern end of the battlefield, Joe Johnston himself was wounded and command of the Army of Northern Virginia passed into the hands of Gustavus Smith. Smith, who could not handle high command and his own nervous health at the same time, was unable to bring order out of chaos and the continued fighting on the next day (June 1) was uncoordinated and equally indecisive. It was over before noon, and Smith was sacked, paving the way for the emergence of Robert Edward Lee.

B. The Seven Days – June 25-July 1, 1862

With the conclusion of the fighting at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks a comparative lull settled over the Richmond front. Lee received heavy reinforcements and reorganized the army. Ever eager to conduct offensive operations the Confederate commander immediately sought a vulnerable spot in the Federal defenses. Meanwhile, General McClellan was content to remain on the defensive. Four corps were placed behind a tight fortified defensive line south of the Chickahominy River. Only the large V Corps under McClellan favorite Fitz John Porter remained north the river. With J.E.B. Stuart's celebrated "Ride Around McClellan" a success, Lee got the intelligence he required and immediately set out to attack the Union 'open' right flank.

1. Oak Grove (June 25)

For the morning of June 25 (the first day of what became known as the Seven Days), General McClellan ordered a probing attack against Richmond's outer fortifications astride the Williamsburg Road for the morning of the 25th. The commanding general was looking into the feasibility of flanking the strong Confederate position at Old Tavern.

At 8 am, Joe Hooker's III Corps division dutifully stepped off into the intervening treeline at Oak Grove and was immediately caught hip deep in a sticky morass that was a northern extension of White Oak Swamp. Confederate troops from Mahone and Wright's brigades of Benjamin Huger's division quickly advanced to meet them. Sedgwick's

II Corps division was brought up in support and the resulting daylong fight ended in a draw as neither side appeared eager to bring on a general engagement. By nightfall, both sides fell back to their original positions. As nothing was really accomplished that was worth the lives spent, the fight was dubbed derisively as the "Battle of the Casualties".

2. Beaver Dam Creek (June 26)

Confident that McClellan would remain on the defensive, Robert E. Lee's plan for the 26th called for three divisions (those of A.P. Hill, Longstreet, and D.H. Hill) to cross the Chickahominy and move down its left bank towards Porter's V Corps, which remained isolated on the north side of the river. Meanwhile, Stonewall Jackson's Valley Army, comprising the divisions of W.H.C. Whiting, Richard Ewell and Jackson's own division under Charles Winder, was to sweep down from the north and turn the Federals out of their immensely strong forward position behind Beaver Dam Creek.

Though a battle at the creek was not contemplated, communications were poor and misunderstandings abounded. The leading elements of Jackson's command did not arrive until mid-afternoon, with the rest of the column strung out for miles. They would not be committed to battle on this day. The Confederates ended up hurling A.P. Hill's division and Ripley's brigade of D.H. Hill's division piecemeal in an ill-advised frontal assault on McCall's V Corps division of Pennsylvania Reserves, which was entrenched on the heights east of Beaver Dam Creek. The Federals here were backed by several batteries with their front protected by a chest deep millpond and felled trees. It was an immensely strong position and the boys in blue made the best of it, inflicting terrible losses on the exposed Confederates. The Battle of Beaver Dam Creek (also known as The Battle of Mechanicsville or Ellerson's Mill) was a frustrating mini-disaster for the new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

3. Gaines's Mill (June 27)

After the previous day's tactical victory at Beaver Dam Creek, General Porter pulled his V Corps back, concentrating it atop the sloping high ground just east of Gaines's Mill in a strong position protecting the vital Chickahominy River crossings. Makeshift breastworks (in some places several lines deep) were erected, further improving already strong defenses.

Meanwhile, the Confederates were delayed on the morning of the 27th by the necessity of rebuilding the dismantled bridges over Beaver Dam Creek. Additionally, the quality of military intelligence was extremely poor. Unfamiliar with the area occupied by the V Corps, General Lee made the mistaken assumption that the Federals were posted along Powhite Creek facing west with an open right flank. Sending General Jackson's command (which now included D.H. Hill's division) to outflank this line from the northeast, General Lee directed Generals A.P. Hill and Longstreet to attack Porter's center and left and pin the Federal army in place. However, it was already late morning by the time the movement began and once again, poor communications, delays, and mistaken assumptions transformed an expected flanking attack into a series of uncoordinated frontal assaults.

A.P. Hill, later supported by Longstreet on his right flank, opened the Battle of Gaines's Mill by launching a series of direct attacks on the Federal center and left. When Jackson's wing finally arrived in the afternoon Hill's units were largely spent. Jackson fed his brigades into the escalating battle as they arrived, somewhat dissipating his force with incremental assaults on the Federal right flank and center.

Finally, late in the day, General Whiting's small division (Hood's and Whiting's brigades) was launched against the Federal center and a breakthrough was finally achieved. This breakthrough was rapidly expanded all across the front and Porter's line, which was slowly reinforced throughout the afternoon and evening by brigades from II and VI Corps, quickly collapsed. Though large numbers of prisoners were lost, the Federal withdrawal was skillful and unit cohesion remained intact. Although V Corps escaped to fight again, Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had won their first major victory together.

4. Golding's Farm and Capture of Dispatch Station (June 28)

Dawn of the 28th found the entire Army of the Potomac on the south bank of the Chickahominy River. At this time, only Huger's division, part of Holmes's division, and Magruder's small command lay between McClellan and Richmond. Once again, the Union commanding general hesitated. Very little action occurred on this day beyond a small skirmish at Golding's Farm (or Garnett Farm).

In the most significant action of the day, Ewell's division of General Jackson's command moved southeast down the left bank of the river to cut the railroad that supplied McClellan's army. With Ewell's capture of Dispatch Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, the Army of the Potomac was now cut off from its base, necessitating the creation of a new secure forward supply depot. McClellan chose the James River and ordered a pullback of his lines to cover it. The artillery and trains would head south on the White Oak Swamp road and thence to the James. The infantry would cover the withdrawal.

5. Savage Station (June 29)

A new Union defensive position (unfortified) was occupied a short distance east of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines at Allen's Farm. With most of his army north of the river, General Lee needed to fix the now retreating Federal army in place in order to give his army time to recross the river and organize a pursuit. Lee gave this task to General Magruder and instructed him to assail the Federal rear guard at Allen's Farm vigorously.

"Prince John" Magruder obeyed the order to move forward but was massively outnumbered and attacked

timidly. Even so, the Federals abandoned their position at Allen's Farm and fell back over a mile to Savage Station. Unfortunately for Magruder's career in the East, Lee did not know the real size of McClellan's rear guard (the better part of three corps) and blamed Prince John excessively for not pressing the attack strongly enough.

Helping the Confederate cause, was the fact that the Federal defense was uncoordinated (McClellan was absent and left no one in charge) and entire divisions left the field without informing their comrades. By the time Magruder reached the open ground around Savage Station the numbers were far more favorable. Regardless of the command problems, the Army of the Potomac was able to disengage with few problems and cross White Oak Swamp to safety.

6. Glendale and White Oak Swamp (June 30)

Disappointed in the results of the fighting on June 29, General Lee's plan for the 30th called for nothing less than the destruction of a large portion of the Army of the Potomac, whose leading elements had already reached the James River at Malvern Hill and Haxall's Landing. Stonewall Jackson's command (which was finally able to cross the Chickahominy River early on the 29th) would move directly south on the White Oak Swamp road and attack the Federal rear elements camped across the swamp. Magruder's command would follow Hill and Longstreet on the Darbytown Road and add their weight to the attack. Meanwhile, Huger's division would drive down the Charles City Road, perhaps meeting the divisions of Longstreet and A.P. Hill at the crossroads of Glendale. Lastly, Theophilus Holmes's division would take the most southerly route (the River Road) and demonstrate against the Union defenses atop Malvern Hill.

Once again, things did not go well for Confederate command and control. Jackson reached White Oak Swamp before noon but made no strong effort to cross. An artillery bombardment directed at Richardson and Smith's divisions (which were covering White Oak Swamp Bridge) was Jackson's only material contribution to the day's overall effort. Benjamin Huger put in a similarly lackluster performance. His advance, though delayed by over a mile of felled trees, was feeble in the extreme and his division was involved in no significant fighting.

The battle finally heated up in the afternoon when Longstreet launched a frontal attack on the Union-held Glendale crossroads with his division. McCall's V Corps division, supported on its flanks by Hooker and Kearny and in its rear by Sedgwick's division, put up a stiff defense. A.P. Hill joined the attack soon after but the Confederates were unable to score a decisive breakthrough though they did capture 20 guns. To the south, Holmes advanced from New Market toward the Malvern cliffs and shelled the heights before withdrawing under heavy counterbattery fire. Magruder, whose command completed a long exhausting approach march, did not make it into any of the fighting on the 30th. Lee was left to stew as the Army of the Potomac was able to complete its withdrawal to Malvern Hill.

7. Malvern Hill (July 1)

On July 1, Robert E. Lee was determined to make one final effort to destroy McClellan's force. The Army of the Potomac was united and occupied a strong position at Malvern Hill. Steep cliffs protected the left flank while the gentle northern slopes provided a perfect killing zone for the Federal artillery. The eastern face of Malvern Hill faced a small stream called Western Run and was heavily defended by II, III, and VI Corps.

On the other side of Western Run was the Poindexter Farm. It was here that Jackson's artillery was to setup. Together with Magruder's guns to the north, Lee planned to create a crossfire that would pave the way for a successful infantry assault. With the typically poor command control demonstrated during the campaign, batteries went into the fight individually on both fronts, only to be churned up in turn. No coordinated bombardment was achieved. General Magruder was once again the victim of circumstance and ended up taking the wrong road to the battlefield. The delay was not fatal but it did mess up Lee's planned deployments.

When the Confederate infantry did finally attack it was a disaster. Magruder and Huger launched frontal assaults south across Crew's field against the Federal guns and infantry defending the lower slopes of Malvern Hill. Meanwhile, D.H. Hill's division and other elements of Jackson's command emerged from protective tree cover and supported the assault on the left. All attacks suffered heavy casualties. The U.S. navy attempted to support the army's defenses by lobbing huge 100-pound Parrott shells over Malvern Hill and into Confederate lines. Unfortunately, the majority landed short and contributed to friendly fire losses more than anything else. Finally, at the height of the attack, it appeared that the Confederates would take the Union guns. However, Federal infantry quickly advanced and restored the front lines. There would be no breakthrough and no crowning victory to cap General Lee's first campaign at the helm of the Army of Northern Virginia.

With the end of the fighting at Malvern Hill, the Seven Days were over. The Army of the Potomac continued its retreat and finally settled into a fortified camp along the James River at Harrison's Landing. Though General Lee was bitterly disappointed in the result of the campaign, he could take some comfort in the fact that he was able to drive the Federal army from the shadow of the capital and seize the strategic initiative in the Eastern theater for the foreseeable future.

IV. Selected Sources:

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V. Acknowledgments

Thanks to:

- John Tiller, Joe Amoral, Mark Adams and everyone at HPS. This is the third Civil War game we've worked on and published together and it gets easier each time.
- All involved in testing, especially Doug Strickler, Brett Schulte, and Mark Adams.
- David M. Rider (reenactor - Company "C" 2nd Regt US Sharpshooters) for providing some unit photographs.
- Special Thanks to Brett Schulte for his help with this project, especially for playtesting and tracking down some important research material with Dave Powell and to Mark Adams for his uncomplaining work and rework on my often picky graphics and map requests.