# Campaign Ozark Notes

## Selected List of Sources:

U.S. Geological Survey maps, 1:24,000 and 1:100,000 scale
Library of Congress American Memory Historical Map Collection 1544-1999
National Archives and Records Administration, archival holdings
*The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*
*The Southern Historical Society Papers*
*The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War*, Major G.B. Davis
*A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* by Frederick H. Dyer
*Compendium of Confederate Armies*, (multi-volume set by state) by Stewart Sifakis
*Battles and Leaders*, Robert U. Johnson, ed.
*Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West* by Earl Hess and William Shea
*The Battle of Carthage: Border War in Southwest Missouri July 5, 1861* by Hinze and Farnham
*Embattled Arkansas* by Michael Banasik
*Up From Arkansas* by Frederick Goman
*The Civil War Battle of Lexington Missouri* by Michael Gillespie
*The Battle of Wilson's Creek* by Edwin Cole Bearss
*Wilson's Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It* by W.G. Piston and Richard Hatcher.
*General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West*, by Albert Castel
*The Tarnished Cavalier: Major General Earl Van Dorn, C.S.A.,* by Arthur B. Carter
*Pursuing and Elusive Quarry* by Scott Burgess and Kim Allen Scott

## Designer's Notes

### General

**Q:** *How did you construct the Order of Battle(s)?*
**A:** Mostly a combination of Official Records and secondary sources. Several exhaustively researched books listed above contain detailed orders of battle down to the individual man and gun type. These authors—Shea and Hess, Hinze and Farnham, Piston and Hatcher, Banasik, and Bearss are to be commended. Their books and research are excellent.

**Q:** *Where did the troop strengths come from?*
**A:** See above. Also, Sifakis' volumes were of great help in finding and/or confirming gun tube types (Thanks to Lee Quantrell for looking these up for me).

**Q:** *Why are all the batteries divided up into sections?*
**A:** At the expense of making movement a little more tedious, I thought the added flexibility combined with the often mixed composition of batteries warranted breaking down the full batteries into 2 gun sections. Similarly, most cavalry regiments were split into battalions and in some cases companies to add flexibility.

**Q:** *Why are mounted cavalry disrupted when moving into rough, orchard, or forest hexes?*
**A:** Mounted cavalry could not operate with any semblance of order while moving through dense forests with thick undergrowth much less mount a charge in formation. The same principle was applied to mounted units moving through both rough and orchard hexes. Of course, infantry formations would also have problems in such terrain but to a lesser degree. Also, having woods disrupt infantry formations does not work as well within the game system.

**Q:** *Why Ozark?*
**A:** If you purchased Corinth then you'll know that I prefer CW subjects off the beaten path. Pea Ridge/Elkhorn Tavern is my favorite battle so it was fun to make a game that included the battle and its campaign. I also have a heavy interest in other early war campaigns in Missouri and Arkansas. Each campaign would not make a full game in itself so I combined the three you find here and added Lexington scenarios to make up Campaign Ozark.

## Lyon's Missouri Campaign

**Q:** Why are you careful to distinguish between Missouri State Guard forces and Confederate forces, weren't they on the same side?
**A:** In practice yes but technically no. The situation in Missouri was contradictory and far from black and white and so for the sake of brevity I will make some generalizations that some may quibble with. Unlike Confederates, Missouri State Guardsmen at least initially still thought of themselves as citizens of the United States. They were pledged to defend Missouri from any invader. With Lyon basically declaring war on Missouri, the MSG became in reality an independent army fighting the Federal Government. Later in the campaign, MSG and Confederate forces would cooperate but would be under independent command.

**Q:** Why are most Missouri State Guard units such poor quality compared with the Federal troops?
**A:** The vast majority of State Guard formations in mid-1861, were completely raw—the enlisted men and officers were brand new volunteers with little or no drill. Weapons, when available, were often obsolete and in disrepair. The capture of several arsenals within the state helped their forces only to a degree. The needs far outstripped the supply. That being said, a few companies or higher units with qualified officers and partly trained soldiers did exist by the time Lyon launched his offensive (ex. Kelly's Infantry at Boonville). Lyon's troops, on the other hand, were fully equipped by the Federal government and many of the German companies were drilling together for months prior to the start of hostilities.

## *Curtis's Pea Ridge Campaign*

**Q:** In the historical battle scenario, why do Confederate and MSG forces have no ammunition supply trains (wagons)?
**A:** Historically, someone in the Confederate command (an anonymous officer is blamed but the ultimate responsibility must lay with Van Dorn) blundered and did not order up the supply trains from Camp Stephens. Camp Stepthens was the Confederate advance base in Little Sugar Creek valley located between Bentonville and Pea Ridge. While the rest of the army went on its long flanking march, the reserve ammunition train and a large garrison force was left behind at the camp. Thus, the Southerners fought the second day of battle with little or no ammunition. However, in the campaign game, the player is not forced to repeat this historical blunder.

**Q:** In this campaign, why are some Missouri formations in the Confederate army and others still in the MSG?
**A:** In November of 1861, the Confederate Government admitted Missouri to the Confederacy. At the time of the Pea Ridge campaign, the army was in the midst of a reorganization. Price was commissioned a Confederate general and enough troops to create several brigades of Missouri troops were organized and transferred to Confederate service. On the other hand, thousands of Missourians elected to remain under state control in various MSG formations.

## Hindman's Fall '62 Campaign

**Q:** Why did you include the Battle of Newtonia in this campaign?
**A:** Though separated by a goodly amount of time, Newtonia had a direct effect on the Cane Hill and Prairie Grove battles. The concentration of Confederate cavalry at Newtonia drew large numbers of Federal troops into SW Missouri and after the battle they were in a position to drive into NW Arkansas. Also, Newtonia led to the disastrous battle of Old Fort Wayne that temporarily destroyed the fighting capability of the South's Indian allies. Hindman would sorely miss them at Prairie Grove. In the campaign, a Southern victory at Newtonia will add later reinforcements at Cane Hill and beyond.

## Strategy Tips
### By Andrew Wagenhoffer

## Confederate Strategy Tips

The player must pick and choose where to make a major effort and be able to accurately assess the amount of likely loss that will go with that effort to see if it is worth the cost. The pre-battle messages and other information given the player during campaign play will hint at what situations are more important than others. Interpreting the intelligence given is an integral part of the game. Due to the choices made by each player, situations will probably arise in which one side or the other will have a major advantage over the other. It is essential that the player recognizes these opportunities throughout the campaign and takes advantage of them. Destroying parts of the Federal forces early in the campaign at little expense will make the subsequent battles much easier. On the other hand, there is no disgrace in retreating without a major fight from an extremely disadvantageous situation of lesser importance to the overall campaign. Remember that any scenario at any victory level can be terminated at any time using a termination bid.

As is readily apparent, the Confederate artillery complement is vastly inferior to that of the Federal forces. Most Confederate cannon are 12 lb. Howitzers, 6-pounders, and other short range smoothbores while the Union forces have many batteries of modern rifled field artillery (3 in. ordnance rifles, James rifles, 10 and 20 lb. Parrotts) and Napoleons. When on the offensive, the Confederate player should seek to engage the Union forces at short range and as rapidly as possible. The few rifled guns and Napoleons that the Confederates do have must be preserved at all costs. Avoid fighting in large open areas as this will help to negate the Union advantage in long range weaponry.

State Guard artillery was very poorly equipped so keep a sharp eye out for dwindling artillery ammo. There isn't any to waste! Additionally, the VP points gained by the enemy for capturing State Guard artillery (which was irreplaceable and thus in some scenarios have values up to 60 VPs/gun) can be catastrophic. Avoid exposing State Guard artillery to capture. Be equally careful with other artillery units. The VP cost of losing guns is much more costly for the Confederate side (45-60 VPs versus 30 VPs for the Union) in this game. Follow the general chart below for the Southern side.

| Battle | VP cost per gun lost |
|---|---|
| Boonville | 60 |
| Carthage | 60 |
| Wilson's Creek | 45 |
| Lexington | 60 |
| | |
| Crane Creek | 60 |
| McDowell | 60 |
| Dunagin's Farm | 45 |
| Pea Ridge | 45 |
| | |
| Newtonia | 45 |
| Cane Hill | 45 |
| Prairie Grove | 45 |

## Union Strategy Tips

The Union player has several special advantages. Along with the advantage of superior firepower—for the most part the Federal forces have rifles for the infantry, breech-loading carbines for the cavalry, and abundant

rifled cannon—the Union player often has better quality infantry and cavalry at his disposal. Open spaces can be dominated by the powerful Union artillery and one should seek to funnel Confederate attacks into these killing zones.

When facing the Missouri State Guard, the superior training and equipment of the Federal forces will allow you to defeat a force much larger than your own. Do not be afraid to press the attack when confronted with situations such as you find at Boonville. The enemy Guardsmen are untrained and very poorly armed. They will likely fall apart quickly when pressed.

Due to the unique conditions and sheer size of the region, Federal infantry divisions in the Trans-Mississippi West oftentimes contained a high percentage of mounted troops (the Kansas Division being a prime example). Use this to your advantage. The mounted contingents are great for creation of mobile reserves, rapid flank extensions, or mounted reserves for exploitation after victory. Use the infantry regiments of the division for the "dirty work".

**General Tips for Both Sides**

1. *Conserve your cavalry:*

Generally, avoid the temptation to fight heavy battles with cavalry alone. Though there are ample opportunities to inflict heavy losses on the opposing cavalry, all-cavalry fights are usually not decisive in their effects on the campaign as a whole and heavy cavalry losses will deprive the army of its "eyes". Also, VPs due to cavalry casualties can be the deciding factor in who wins the scenario. Cavalry are best used for covering exposed flanks, screening an advance, exploiting gains, or covering the army's rear by blocking roads and trails that the enemy can use to their advantage. Sustained fighting especially against enemy infantry cannot be recommended in ordinary circumstances. If you do fight, be sure to concentrate several regiments in reserve so that overwhelmed units can be safely extricated. You can't afford to lose cavalry regiments.

2. *Watch your artillery ammunition supply:*

Batteries cannot be fired at all possible opportunity without exhausting the ammunition reserves. Conserve ammunition for the second day if a continued fight is expected. Confederate and especially State Guard artillery was plagued by the inability to maintain an adequate supply of reserve ammunition.

3. *Preserve your leaders:*

Devastating losses in leadership in a single battle will effect the entire campaign. Often formations filled with poorly trained troops are held together only by the quality of their leaders. Think twice before committing leaders to the front lines regularly.

4. *Pay close attention to the information provided by the campaign screens and pre-battle messages:*

Valuable intelligence is provided for the player during the game. Carefully read **all** the choices and weigh the pros and cons of each before committing yourself. Also, and this is **very important**, the message preceding the beginning of each scenario can provide crucial clues on how to fight the battle. If given direct instructions it is certainly in the player's best interest to follows those directives. **Always check the victory conditions before each battle**. The VP gain/loss for cavalry and artillery varies from scenario to scenario.

5. *Use termination bids:*

Some scenarios are 2 day affairs. If *neither* side wishes to initiate more combat after even a short time period then **by all means use the termination bid**—it greatly shortens campaign completion time.

6. *Use historical tactics—they work!*

The best way to learn about how CW battles were really fought is to read modern tactical microhistories (Shea and Hess's Pea Ridge books is a perfect example).

7. *Perhaps most importantly, always remember that each individual battle is only a part of the larger campaign*:

Though there is limited straggler return between battles it is best to consider every man and every gun

irreplaceable.  As opposed to the common mindset of players involved in tactical level games covering single battles, Ozark requires that objectives be met with some concern for casualties, as losses are carried over to the next situation's battle.  Never lose an opportunity to flank your opponent out of a strong position rather than carry it by direct assault.


**Thoughts On the Use of Artillery**

- Always detach infantry units to support your batteries. You'll be glad you did when your lines break and the guns need to be withdrawn. Most batteries are lost needlessly due to the temptation of deploying all available units at the front.
- Park artillery that is likely to be ineffective. There is no reason to have all your artillery in action in all situations. If the terrain is constricted, rough, and without open space to the front, park the artillery in the rear. You are just asking for disaster if you deploy your artillery in the forest. They have no field of fire and are impossible to extricate if your lines collapse.
- Spread your artillery out to historical frontages and avoid hub to hub deployment. The wider the front the greater the opportunity for bringing enfilade fire to bear. Rifled artillery on the flanks and howitzers/Napoleons in the center is a good combination.
- Avoid placing rifled guns in the front lines. They are your most valuable pieces and are less effective at canister range.
- If unsupported and capture appears imminent, limber the guns. You can't count on a blast of canister to disrupt the enemy. The chances of the crew getting killed while limbering up is much less than the near certainty of losing the guns when unsupported and meleed. It is relatively difficult for a meleeing unit to capture limbered guns.

### *Comments on Command Ranges*

The newest version of the game includes command ranges for corps and army leaders to go along with the ones that already exist at the brigade and division level. This was implemented for several reasons. It allows these higher leaders to exert more of a personal presence rather than a global unlimited range.  With the game's often large maps, I felt that we could no longer provide unlimited ranges for corps and army leaders to "pass down" their command (there is an option for the designer to leave the corps and army command ranges at infinity if he or she so desires). It also allows the scenario designer to put more leader individuality into the game at the army level. Poor leaders or those that have a proclivity to move immediately to the front and ignore the larger picture can be given shorter command ranges.

As a player, it is important to inspect the parameter data when the scenario begins. You'll notice that command ranges of all types vary widely between scenarios but tend to improve (widen) as leaders go from disorganized, inexperienced forces (ex. MSG in June of 1861) to veterans (ex. Confederate forces at Prairie Grove). There is a general increase in command range from mid-1861 to late 1862. You'll find the Union forces having superior command capability during the Lyon and Pea Ridge Campaigns before they "even out" by late '62 with the Fall Campaign and Prairie Grove.


# *Historical Notes*
### **By Andrew Wagenhoffer**

## **Lyon's 1861 Missouri Campaign**

"Far better that the blood of every man, woman, and child should flow than defy the Federal government. This means war!" With these harsh words spoken by U.S. Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon at the Planter's Hotel in St. Louis, the Civil War in the state of Missouri began in earnest. Stunned by Lyon's uncompromising (and perhaps

unbalanced) behavior, Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson and militia general Sterling Price immediately left for Jefferson City to try and piece together a defense of the state.

General Lyon, ever aggressive, immediately planned an ambitious offensive that would secure Missouri for the Federal government. Unlike Governor Jackson, Lyon had available about 10,000 well-armed and trained troops (mostly taken from the sizable German population) sworn into Federal service. Additionally, a significant force of regular troops and artillery bolstered Lyon's command.. Similarly, a brigade-sized force of regulars and Kansans under Major Samuel Sturgis was assembling in Kansas at Ft. Leavenworth. The fledgling Missouri state forces were in deep trouble right from the start.

While a Federal invasion loomed, the state assembly quickly passed legislation creating the Missouri State Guard (MSG) and releasing funds for its supplies and equipage. The man chosen to command the MSG was former governor and Mexican War veteran Sterling Price. The MSG was organized into 9 divisions commanded by prominent Missourians appointed by the governor. The term *division* was a geographic designation rather than an indication of the size of the units, which varied greatly in numbers and degree of organization.  Pro-Southern sentiment in the state of Missouri was centered in the cotton and hemp-growing region called Little Dixie, comprised of the west-central counties bordering the Missouri River.  With the passing of the legislation, State Guard camps sprung up all over the state.  Two of the most important were located along the Missouri River at Lexington and Boonville. Nearly all the guardsmen who arrived at the new camps were miserably armed and completely raw.

### Boonville

Lyon recognized that immediate action would likely catch the Missouri State Guard in a disorganized state. Therefore, he proposed an invasion of Missouri on three widely separated fronts.  A brigade-sized force under Lyon's personal command would move by steamboat up the Missouri River and capture the state capital at Jefferson City.  Sturgis's wing would move southeast into Missouri from Ft. Leavenworth.  At the same time, Brig. Gen. Thomas Sweeny would transfer his men by rail from St. Louis to Rolla after which he would strike out for southwestern Missouri to cut off any State forces that might escape Lyon and Sturgis.  It was a bold and risky plan, but, if successful, it would allow the vast majority of the state to fall under Federal control.

Governor Jackson realized the weakness of his position and, knowing General Lyon to be aggressive, decided to trade space for time.  This would force the abandonment of the state capital. The Guard artillery under Brig. Gen. Mosby Monroe Parsons was quickly moved to the south out of harm's way and the forces yet assembled were prepared for a retreat to SW Missouri.  But now the governor had a serious political problem. Retreating without a major effort to defend Little Dixie would likely cause thousands of Guardsmen to abandon the colors and go home.  Additionally, untold thousands of potential recruits would be stranded in northern Missouri if the river crossings became federally controlled. Unfortunately for Jackson and Price, they had no choice but to retreat. Camp Bacon east of Boonville was ordered held until the last possible moment in order to maintain the presence in Little Dixie needed to rally support to the Governor's cause.

For Lyon, the trip upriver from St. Louis by steamboat was rapid and uneventful. The capital was taken without a fight and two days later the boats were nearing the State Guard camps at Boonville. A suitable landing place was found several miles east of the town. By 8 am on June 17 most of the troops were ashore and winding their way up the bluffs. Their objective was to defeat the force of Rebels at Camp Bacon and capture the armory just east of town.

At the Adams house and farm four miles east of Boonville, Lyon's 1100 men met the 750 Guardsmen who had advanced to meet them. What was meant to be a delaying action on the part of the Southerners became a rout. The "Boonville Races" had shown Lyon just how weak the State Guard really was. The untrained, ill-disciplined, and poorly armed Guardsmen were no match for Lyon's well-trained and armed Federals.  The Missourians would need an extended period of organization and training before they could meet the Federals on equal terms.  After Boonville, the retreat to SW Missouri was begun in earnest.  There, the Federal supply lines would be stretched to the limit and the Missourians could link up with Confederate forces in NW Arkansas for a counteroffensive.

### Carthage

During the retreat, it became apparent that sentiment for the Southern cause was still high as thousands of new recruits flocked to the colors. Unfortunately, most arrived without weapons of any kind!  As the column approached Carthage from the north, it encountered a small Federal force of two regiments under the command of Col. Franz Sigel.

Sigel, in temporary command of Sweeny's wing in the area around Springfield, had learned of the approach of a large force of MSG under Governor Jackson. With thoughts of glory, Sigel rashly advanced northward to intercept the Guard. Eight miles north of Carthage, the Federals deployed for battle but found themselves outnumbered almost four to one.  The Federal commander immediately saw the necessity of retreat. In one of his rare good efforts, Sigel conducted a masterful fighting withdrawal, retreating the 8 miles between his position and Carthage while in the process fording several creeks and a river before reaching safety.  With Sigel out of the way, the State Guard was now free to link up with Confederate forces from Arkansas under Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch.

### Wilson's Creek

After Carthage, the action switched to the town of Springfield. Springfield, largely Unionist in sentiment, was the most important town in SW Missouri. After occupying the town, Lyon began to enlist the citizens into Home Guard units.  Unfortunately for Lyon, his army was at the end of its logistical rope and could advance no further. Even worse, General Fremont (commanding the Missouri Department) not only refused repeated requests for reinforcements but ordered elsewhere badly needed troops, leaving the Springfield army weak and exposed. Lyon was ordered to retreat but felt he could not do so without a fight. The combined State Guard and Confederate force currently camped south of town at Wilson's Creek was so superior in cavalry that a fighting retreat would likely result in disaster. According to Lyon, a spoiling attack was needed to rock the Rebels back on their heels and give the Federal army the opportunity to make an unhindered retreat northeast to Rolla. Yielding to the determination of General Sigel, Lyon agreed to a two-pronged attack.  While Lyon attacked the enemy camps frontally, Sigel would take a brigade on a circuitous flanking march and hit them simultaneously in the rear.

The Southern forces at Wilson's Creek were rent with dissension. McCulloch and Price did not get along and the Confederates were disdainful of the fighting ability of the Missourians. Nonetheless, the combined army was a formidable force.  The MSG was camped west of the creek below an imposing height later known as Bloody Hill. The Confederate infantry was east of the creek and the cavalry camps were located in the fields to the south.

During the night of August 9, the Union army quietly moved out of its lines at Springfield and marched toward the enemy camps at Wilson's Creek. At dawn, Lyon's wing made contact with Southern cavalry north of Bloody Hill. To the south, Sigel had positioned his artillery atop the heights east of the creek and commenced bombarding the Southern cavalry camps.  The cannon fire was highly successful and the cavalry was completely routed.

At the battle's north end, Lyon was able to push forward and capture Bloody Hill. He could go no further however as he was buffeted by wave after wave of Southern assaults. A small force of regulars under Capt. Joseph Plummer was sent by Lyon across the creek to cover the Federal left flank but it was quickly routed by Confederate troops.

Meanwhile, back on the southern front, Sigel advanced to a small creek at the base of Bloody Hill. Disaster struck when approaching Southern troops were mistaken as friendlies.  These troops attacked and quickly routed Sigel's brigade. Lyon was now on his own.

As morning turned to midday, the Federal army atop Bloody Hill, though holding valiantly, was becoming increasingly hard pressed.  While inspiring his troops to even greater efforts, General Lyon was killed. Command devolved upon Major Sturgis and he elected to retreat.  The exhausted Southerners did not pursue.


## Lexington

After the Southern victory at Wilson's Creek, General Price was eager to advance to the Missouri River to regain the vital "Little Dixie" area.  This area, if controlled for an extended period of time, would likely serve to add thousands of recruits to the Missouri State Guard and regalvanize pro-Southern efforts in the state. Confederate General Ben McCulloch, however, refused to cooperate and Price was forced to advance alone.  After a skirmish with some Kansans at Dry Fork Creek, the MSG pressed northward. Their goal was Lexington, which was defended by the "Irish Brigade" under Col. James Mulligan. Realizing he was likely to be attacked, Mulligan built a rather formidable line of fortifications on the high ground surrounding the Masonic College north of town.

By September 18, Price had surrounded Mulligan on three sides. After capturing the riverboat landing below Lexington along with a supply boat docked there, the Missouri State Guard now had Mulligan completely invested.  Meanwhile, several miles away and across the river, a Federal relief force under now Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis clashed with State Guard forces under Mosby Parsons.  Unable to advance further, Sturgis withdrew and the siege continued.

The 20th was the day of the final showdown.  Enterprising Guardsmen soaked massive hemp bales in the river and rolled them uphill towards the Federal trenches. Several lines of these "moving breastworks" worked their way inexorably towards the western end of Mulligan's defenses. With no friendly relief forces in sight and unable to counter these measures, Mulligan finally realized defeat was inevitable and surrendered at 3 o'clock.  With the capture of 3,500 prisoners, 3,000 stand of arms, 10 cannon and mortars, and over $100,000 worth of commissary supplies, Price and his State Guardsmen had achieved a major victory.  Unfortunately for them, the victory could not be exploited, as the thousands of new recruits gained by the victory could not be armed and a huge Federal army under General John C. Fremont would soon arrive to attack him. Price was forced to retreat back to Springfield.

## Pea Ridge Campaign

At the beginning of 1862, Federal forces in Missouri still held the Missouri River Valley and the important city of St. Louis.  Sterling Price and the Missouri State Guard defiantly maintained a presence in the state at Springfield. This was intolerable to the commander of the Department of the Missouri, Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck.  He placed Brig. Gen. Samuel Ryan Curtis in command of the Army of the Southwest and directed him to drive the Southern forces from the state. Meanwhile, the Confederate government appointed Maj.  Gen. Earl Van Dorn commander of the Military District of the Trans-Mississippi, giving him authority over Price and the commander of the Arkansas army, Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch.

### Crane Creek and McDowell

On February 13, after an arduous advance across the Ozark Plateau in terrible weather, Curtis's small army was finally within striking distance of Springfield. Outnumbered and unwilling to risk battle, Price abandoned Springfield before the Federals arrived and retreated down the Telegraph Road 30 miles to the southwest before setting up a new camp at Crane Creek, Missouri.

At the time of Curtis's advance, Price's army was in the midst of a reorganization.  On Nov. 28, 1861, the Confederate Congress had added a star to the national flag representing the state of Missouri.  Price was made a Confederate general and he worked immediately to transfer as many State Guardsmen as possible to Confederate service. At Crane Creek, the army was provided with an excellent camp to continue the reorganization.

After detachments to guard the ever lengthening supply line back to Rolla from Springfield, the Federal army was down to around 12,000 men in four divisions. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were composed mostly of Germans and were commanded by Brig. Gen. Franz Sigel. Curtis placed the 3rd and 4th divisions under his direct command and moved to attack Price.

The Southerners at Crane Creek were in a vulnerable position. 15 miles south of Crane Creek lay the town of McDowell. A road from Springfield passed wide to the left of Price's position before uniting with the Telegraph Road at the hamlet of McDowell.  Curtis directed Sigel to advance his two divisions on this route. Hopefully for

the Federals, Sigel would arrive at McDowell before Price even realized he was in danger. This was not to be. Sigel did not move fast enough and Curtis's advance units tipped his hand by lobbing shells into the Southern camps. Thinking he was about to be attacked, Price immediately retreated, undoing Curtis's plan.

### Dunagin's Farm

After McDowell, the Southern army made a rapid retreat through the towns of Cassville and Keetsville and entered Arkansas. The narrow, winding Telegraph Road was excellent for ambushing rash pursuers, necessitating a cautious Federal advance. On the morning of February 17, the last of the Southern army filed up out of the hollows at Elkhorn Tavern and passed over Little Sugar Creek in the direction of Fayetteville. At 1 pm, the leading Federal units climbed their way out of the Cross Timber Hollow and quickened the pace of the pursuit, hoping to catch Price's rear guard.

Just as the last of Price's units crossed Little Sugar Creek, a brigade of McCulloch's Confederate division arrived under the command of Louis Hebert. Hebert knew that pursuing Federal cavalry was not far behind so he deployed his men on the bluffs south of Little Sugar Creek as a show of force before falling back about a mile to Dunagin's Farm. There, Hebert's brigade was joined by the 1st Missouri Brigade from Price's army. The onrushing Federal cavalry blundered into the Southerners lined up fronting Dunagin's field and were repulsed with heavy loss. The infantry of Carr's 4th Division arrived soon after, however, and the Confederates withdrew.

### Pea Ridge

After the fight at Dunagin's farm, the Southern army continued on to Fayetteville, Arkansas. On February 20, Price united forces with Ben McCulloch's Arkansas army. Soon after, Earl Van Dorn arrived to take overall command, renaming the combined force the Army of the West. At the same time up north, the Federal army reached the end of its logistics tether at Little Sugar Creek. Curtis was forced to pass over to the defensive and he proceeded to fortify the bluffs on the creek's north side. Initiative now passed over into the hands of Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn, who gladly grasped it.

The imposing wooded bluffs north of Little Sugar Creek formed an excellent defensive position. To avoid a bloody frontal assault, Van Dorn proposed a very aggressive and risky plan that would bypass the enemy strongpoints. From Fayetteville, the army would make a forced march northwest through Elm Springs and Bentonville before turning east and proceeding down the Little Sugar Creek Valley. Before reaching the extreme right flank of the Federal lines the army would turn left (north) onto the Bentonville Detour, which winds its way behind Pea Ridge to emerge at the Telegraph Road beyond Elkhorn Tavern in Cross Timber Hollow. With his army directly astride the Federal line of communications on the Telegraph Road, the Federals would be trapped and forced to fight their way through the hollow or surrender.

Unfortunately for his men, Van Dorn chose a night march at a killing pace with no food or rest. Straggling was heavy, disorganizing the infantry columns. By midnight, the head of the exhausted column approached the western face of Pea Ridge and the rear of the Federal army. To add to the marchers's misery, scouts discovered that the enemy had felled timber over the road ahead. It was not until 7 am on March 7 that the army finally emerged from the detour and spilled onto the Telegraph Road in Cross Timber Hollow. So far things were not going too badly.

Meanwhile, General Curtis was not idle. The small force at Elkhorn tavern was alerted and Sigel was directed to dispatch some cavalry and artillery in the direction of Leetown, a small town behind the army's right flank. In a sharp fight at Foster's farm, the Federal cavalry was routed by the mounted brigade of McCulloch's division. After capturing the Northern artillery, McCulloch deployed his division for an attack south toward Leetown. While the Confederates prepared their attack, infantry and artillery from Sigel's two divisions arrived and went in line on the southern edge of Oberson's Field. While scouting ahead, General McCulloch was killed by enemy skirmishers. Soon after, the second-in-command General McIntosh was shot dead, leaving the Confederate division leaderless and disorganized. In the ensuing battle in the heavily wooded area east of Oberson's field, the Southerners only got a portion of their forces into the fight and were completely defeated.

While the Federals enjoyed success at Leetown, things rapidly took a turn for the worse at Elkhorn Tavern. After a

rather disorganized attack, Van Dorn and Price emerged from the hollow and pushed the Union defenders out of the tavern area and in amongst their supply trains. Fortunately for Curtis, night fell before complete disaster struck his army.

As March 8th dawned, Van Dorn prepared to face off with Curtis for a second day. During the night, the troops from the Leetown fight had crossed behind Pea Ridge and joined Price near Elkhorn Tavern. However, through a command mix-up, the army ordnance trains were still back at Camp Stephens in Little Sugar Creek valley. A brief morning bombardment exhausted most of the Southern artillery ammunition and much of the infantry was without cartridges.

Although the Federals were now completely cut off, General Curtis confidently assembled his army in the fields fronting the Confederate lines around Elkhorn Tavern. After a fierce artillery barrage the blue line moved forward. A crestfallen Van Dorn ordered a hasty retreat and the Confederate army, angry at having to retreat after the previous day's victory, rapidly fell apart and melted away before the Federal attack. Most escaped down the Huntsville Road and, after a grueling retreat, were ordered across the Mississippi to bolster the reeling Confederate cause in Tennessee.


## Fall and Winter Ozark Campaign of 1862

The summer recruitment campaign of 1862 in Missouri was a mixed success for the Confederate army. Victories at Lone Jack and Independence were offset by crushing defeats in the central and northern parts of the state. By late summer, Southern forces were once again confined to SW Missouri and NW Arkansas. However, the arrival of Confederate General Thomas C. Hindman served to revitalize the war effort and a new army was forged, the 1st Corps, Army of the Trans-Mississippi. During this time, the Federals formed the Army of the Frontier from the merging of the Kansas and Missouri Departments, and placed the new army under General John Schofield.

### Newtonia

While Hindman met with his superior, General Rains was placed in temporary command in Arkansas. Disobeying orders, Rains advanced his cavalry (under the command of General Douglas Cooper) into SW Missouri. The Federals responded by forming a provisional division of three brigades under General Frederick Salomon to counter the Confederate advance. Readying his command for a fight, Cooper ordered a concentration of his forces at Newtonia, a SW Missouri town strategically located at a junction of six roads.

Kansas General James Blunt moved immediately to counter this move. He placed two of his brigades under the command of Gen. Frederick Salomon and ordered them to move directly to Newtonia by the Sarcoxie Road. A third brigade of Missouri militia—Missouri State Militia (MSM) and Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM)—was located at Mt. Vernon, a small town northeast of Newtonia. Rather than march directly to Newtonia, the militia brigade under Col. George Hall was directed to take a much longer route, crossing over to the Sarcoxie Road far to the north and following the rest of the division to Newtonia.

A part of Cooper's Confederate cavalry was camped at Newtonia, with reinforcements located within supporting range to the south. The area immediately surrounding Newtonia was dotted with fields and orchards. Several wood and stone fences just west of town would provide excellent defensive positions for the cavalry and its supporting artillery.

Early on the morning of September 30, the vanguard of Salomon's division advanced to Newtonia and found the heights northwest of town unoccupied. After skirmishing throughout the morning and early afternoon, the rest of Salomon's division arrived and deployed on the high ground. Hall's militia brigade was two hours behind and missed the fight. The Battle of Newtonia was characterized more by heavy skirmishing in the fields north and west of town and artillery bombardment rather than grand charges. Without his third brigade and after suffering heavy casualties, Salomon decided to withdraw, leaving the field to the Confederates, who claimed victory.

### Cane Hill and Prairie Grove

After Newtonia, Cooper's provisional division was broken up. The Indian units fell back into the Indian Territory and were defeated by a detachment of Blunt's forces at Old Fort Wayne on October 22nd, effectively removing them from the Confederate order of battle for the upcoming campaign. The way was open for a Federal invasion of Arkansas. General Blunt and his Kansas Division were ordered to hold NW Arkansas while the other two divisions of the Army of the Frontier were concentrated south of Springfield, Mo. Accordingly, Blunt moved into Arkansas and camped at Rhea's Mill.

Seven miles to the south at Cane Hill, was camped Confederate General John S. Marmaduke's newly-formed cavalry division. Marmaduke's division was comprised of two brigades and an independent regiment of Missourians. Recently, General Hindman had received approval for offensive action but his army was still unorganized. Therefore, the cavalry division was stationed at Cane Hill to protect the still-forming army and prevent Federal patrols from gaining intelligence. From here Federal movements into Arkansas and/or the Indian Territory could be monitored.

Seeing an opportunity to smash the Confederate cavalry, General Blunt moved quickly, putting his division on the direct road to Cane Hill. By 10 am on November 28, the Kansas division arrived at the north end of Cane Hill. General Blunt and his escort raced to the front and opened the battle. When the Union forces struck, Marmaduke's division was not concentrated for defense. Col. JO Shelby's Iron Brigade was in line across Cane Hill's north end while the rest of the division was camped about a mile behind. Blunt used his superiority in numbers and firepower to drive Marmaduke down Cane Hill, over Reed's Mountain, and through the crucial crossroads at Morrow's Farm. After the battle of Cane Hill, Marmaduke retreated to Hindman's camps in the south.

On the Federal side, General Blunt, realizing how exposed his new position was, withdrew his Kansas Division back to the north end of Cane Hill. From Cane Hill, Blunt sent a plea to General Herron to take the 2nd and 3rd divisions and move to join the Kansas Division in Arkansas. Herron moved immediately, assembling a provisional cavalry brigade under Dudley Wickersham and sending it along to Blunt. The horse soldiers reached Blunt's position during the night of December 6.

On that same day, General Hindman began his counteroffensive. Learning of Herron's approach, Hindman decided to advance and defeat Herron then turn and destroy Blunt. Leaving a cavalry brigade on Reed's Mountain to occupy Blunt's attention, the Confederate army marched up the Cove Creek Road to Prairie Grove Church. Near the church, the advance under Shelby routed the vanguard of Herron's two divisions and drove them across the Illinois River.

Rather than build on the momentum gained and continue his advance, Hindman surrendered the initiative to Herron and went over to the defensive, occupying the heights at Prairie Grove. General Herron quickly forded the Illinois River and assaulted Hindman's right flank near the Borden House. After initial success, the attacking bluecoats were counterattacked by dismounted cavalry and routed. Sensing victory, the Confederates raised a shout and poured downhill towards the Federal lines, to be promptly slaughtered by the Union artillery.

While Herron and Hindman regrouped to continue the fight on the Confederate right flank, the Kansas Division arrived on the field. At 10 am Blunt had realized that the Rebels on Reed's Mountain were not the main body and gathered up his division for a forced march to Rhea's Mill and on to a junction with Herron at Prairie Grove. Hindman quickly moved to extend his left to meet Blunt on that flank. As the sun dipped over the horizon, Blunt's final assault was met and repulsed by a narrow margin. The Battle of Prairie Grove was over.

Low on supplies and ammunition, Hindman ordered a retreat. As the 1st Corps, Army of the Trans-Mississippi returned to the Ozarks, it melted away as many disillusioned conscripts took the opportunity to escape the service. What began as a promising Confederate offensive turned into a complete disaster with massive losses in both manpower and equipment. Northern Arkansas would never again see a Confederate infantry force large enough to threaten the Union hold on the Ozark region.